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OPA AND ECONOMIc Loss:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR GOLDBERG
David W. Robertson
Time and space for this response are in short supply, and this is not an
occasion for further comparison of Professor Goldberg's and my rhetorical
technique and tone. Readers will decide for themselves which of us-he in
his Report1 or I in my critique 2-has come closer to producing an "advo-
cacy document."3 This response is confined to our more important points
of substantive disagreement.
I. IN PURPORTING TO APPLY OPA's Two-TIERED FACTUAL
CAUSATION REQUIREMENT, PROFESSOR GOLDBERG CREATES
A NONTRADITIONAL (AND UNHELPFUL)
COUNTERFACTUAL INQUIRY.
A. A Preliminary Lesson from the Jurisprudence and Literature of the
But-For Test: The Modesty Maxim
It is well understood that the but-for test for factual causation entails
the creation of a counterfactual hypothesis. When the inquiry is whether a
defendant's tortious conduct was a but-for cause of a plaintiffs injury, the
counterfactual hypothesis entails imagining the defendant conducting itself
in a non-tortious manner. As expressed in the Third Torts Restatement,
"the causal inquiry asks whether the harm would have occurred if the [de-
fendant] had not acted tortiously." 4 The counterfactual hypothesis changes
only the defendant's conduct and that only to the minimal extent necessary
to remove its tortious aspect.5
Courts often point to the need for focusing the but-for question-what
would have happened if?-on a conservatively-imagined counterfactual
1. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, LIABILITY FOR ECONOMic Loss IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEEPWA-
TER HORIZON SPILL 7 (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/Goldberg.Memorandum.
of.Law.2010.pdf, reprinted in 30 Miss. C. L. REV. 335 app. (2011).
2. David W. Robertson, The Oil Pollution Act's Provisions on Damages for Economic Loss, 30
Miss. C.L. REV. 157 (2011).
3. John C.P. Goldberg, OPA and Economic Loss: A Reply to Professor Robertson, 30 Miss.
C.L. REV. 203, 204 (2011) [hereinafter "Goldberg Reply"].
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26
cmt. f (2010).
5. See David W. Robertson, Metaphysical Truth vs. Workable Tort Law: Adverse Ambitions?,
88 TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1061 (2010) (book review) (stressing that the counterfactual hypothesis should be
"intellectually conservative," "as modest as possible"); David W. Robertson, Causation in the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Three Arguable Mistakes, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1009 n.11 (2009)
(same); David W. Robertson, The Vocabulary of Negligence Law: Continuing Causation Confusion, 58
LA. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1997) (same); David Vt. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 1765, 1770-71 (1997) (same).
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world.' When this precept is ignored, bizarre chains of reasoning can en-
sue.' (At times it will be useful to refer to this precept as "the modesty
maxim.")
6. See Lekas & Drivas, Inc. v. Goulandris, 306 F.2d 426, 430 (2d Cir. 1962) (faulting the trial
court's but-for analysis for constructing an unduly ambitious counterfactual hypothesis); Boyer v. John-
son, 360 So. 2d 1164, 1166-67 (La. 1978) (stating that speculation beyond the facts of the case about
whether the decedent could have died in another way was irrelevant in determining the cause of death);
Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 755-57 (Tex. 1965) (emphasizing the importance of focusing
the but-for inquiry on the plaintiff's two theories of wrongful conduct, to the exclusion of other possible
causal scenarios); Green v. Menveg Props. Inc., 271 P.2d 544, 550-51 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (con-
cluding that the proper counterfactual inquiry regarding allegations of causal negligence against an
unlicensed electrician who was injured by a collapsing light pole was whether a licensed man would
have climbed onto the pole, and not what would have happened if the electrician had honored the
licensing requirement by staying home that day); Ford v. Trident Fisheries Co., 122 N.E. 389, 390 (Mass.
1919) (refusing to speculate whether an additional oar in the rescue boat-a hypothetical change of the
facts-would have prevented the victim's death).
7. For an example of an overly ambitious counterfactual construction, see the cargo (cheese)
damage case, Lekas & Drivas, 306 F.2d 426. The defendant's ship loaded plaintiffs cheese at a Greek
port, intending to carry it via the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic to New York, a projected one-
month, 5,000-mile voyage in cool fall weather. Id. at 427-28. Instead, the ship was diverted by the onset
of World War II hostilities, making a 13,000-mile detour around Africa's Cape of Good Hope and
thence eventually to New York. Id. Because of war-time conditions, this turned into a six-month voy-
age with many delays, much of it in extreme heat. Id. at 428. The cheese arrived at New York rotted
and useless. Id. The trial court found that stowage of the cheese in an unventilated hold was a cause-
in-fact of the spoilage because-had the cheese traveled to New York on the expected Mediterranean
voyage-stowage in a better-ventilated hold would probably have avoided the spoilage. Id. at 430.
"This was a remarkably ambitious counterfactual construction. It imagined World War II out of exis-
tence." Metaphysical Truth, supra note 5, at 1062. Writing for the Second Circuit, Judge Friendly cor-
rected the error on appeal, finding no liability because the cheese would have spoiled on the voyage
that actually occurred regardless of where on the vessel it had been stowed. Lekas & Driva, 306 F.2d at
430.
For another example of an unduly ambitious counterfactual construction, see The Normannia, 62
F. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1894). Plaintiff booked first-cabin passage from Southampton to New York. Id. at
470. A cholera epidemic then broke out in Europe. Id. Wishing to cancel his trip if steerage passen-
gers (a feared source of contagion) were to be aboard the ship, plaintiff sought and received assurances
from the vessel's agent that no steerage passengers would be carried. Id. But once the ship was under
way, plaintiff learned that 500 steerage passengers were aboard. Id. When the ship reached New York,
its passengers had to be quarantined for two weeks. Id. at 471. If no steerage passengers had been
aboard, the quarantine would have been shortened by a week. Id. at 480. In limiting the plaintiff's
recovery of damages to the consequences of only the second week of quarantine, the court fumbled the
but-for analysis. The court correctly identified the defendant's wrongful conduct as the agent's misrep-
resentation. Id. at 471. And it then properly followed through by asking what would have happened in
a counterfactual world with the agent behaving properly. Id. at 482. But at that point the court grew
ambitious and unduly imaginative with the hypothetical correction of the agent's conduct. Rather than
asking the obvious question-what would have happened if the agent had told the truth (the plaintiff
would have avoided all quarantine)-the court addressed what would have happened if the statement
the agent made (no steerage passengers) had been true (one week of quarantine rather than two). This
imagined "correction" entailed "taking [500] steerage passengers off the ship." Vocabulary, supra note
5, at 9 n.343.
A third example of an unduly ambitious counterfactual construction comes from the academic
literature. See JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF ToRTs 172 (6th ed. 1983):
Suppose a pedestrian is knocked down from behind by a car, while walking on the shoulder of
the road-contrary to the highway code-in the direction of, instead of facing, the motor
traffic. It would be a mistake to affirm his causal contribution to the accident simply by saying
that if he had been on the other side of the road, the defendant's car would not have run into
him. The proper question to ask is rather if he could have avoided the accident, had he been
facing the defendant's car. The reason for so formulating the causal hypothetical is that the
prohibition was not against his being where he was, but against having the traffic behind him.
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B. The Counterfactual Inquiry Entailed in Section 2702(B)(2)(E)
Recall Professor Goldberg's "Universe of Potential Pure Economic
Loss Claimants."8 For understandable and perfectly legitimate reasons,
Professor Goldberg has set these up as imaginary claimants asserting harms
from an imaginary oil spill, but we can sharpen and simplify the present
analysis by recognizing that Goldberg's posited "large discharge of oil in
the Gulf region" 9 is for practical purposes the 200-million-gallon Macondo
spill. OPA requires a claimant seeking economic-loss damages from such a
spill to show that the damages sought "result[ed] from" the spill (33 U.S.C.
§ 2702(a)) and were "due to the injury, destruction, or loss of [property] or
natural resources" (33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E)).1 0 I maintain that Sections
2702(a) and 2702(b)(2)(E) both set forth factual causation requirements,
and that the Section 2702(b)(2)(E) requirement-calling upon the claimant
to show that his damages would probably have been avoided if the spill had
not produced "injury, destruction, or loss of [property] or natural re-
sources"-will very likely defeat "Universe" claimants 16 and 17 (boy-
cotted Boise gas station and idled New York City caterer) and probably
also a number of the others."
In his Reply, Professor Goldberg asserts that "Robertson ... is wrong
about his own test,"1 2 and that when Section 2702(b)(2)(E) is read as a
factual causation requirement it excludes almost nobody. For example,
here is how Professor Goldberg supposes the Boise gas station case would
be analyzed under the two-tiered factual causation interpretation of OPA:
(1) Claimant would easily be able to show that the boycott-
entailed lost income "result[ed] from" the spill, thereby sat-
isfying Section 2702(a).
Hence the causality of the infraction must be tested by turning him around, rather than trans-
ferring him to the other side of the road.
From the standpoint of the modesty maxim, it seems obvious that the approach Professor Fleming
rejected as overly "simpl[e]" was in fact preferable. The most readily imagined correction is not to have
the pedestrian comply with the statute by developing another destination or walking backward, as
Fleming would have it; it is much simpler and more easily imaginable to picture the pedestrian comply-
ing with the statute by proceeding toward his destination on the other side of the road. By allowing the
prohibition's purpose to infiltrate the factual causation analysis, Professor Fleming committed the car-
dinal error of conflating cause-in-fact with proximate cause. For a demonstration, complete with copi-
ous authorities, that this conflation is indeed a cardinal sin, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26
cmt. a and Reporters' Notes, pp. 346-47, 357-58 (2010).
8. See GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 12-14 (16-item "Universe of Potential Pure Economic Loss
Claimants," using letters of the alphabet to identify the claimants); Robertson, supra note 2, at 170-72
(virtually identical 17-item "Universe" with numerals added for easier identification).
9. GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 12.
10. My original article emphasizes throughout that Sections 2702(a) and 2702(b)(2)(E) express
two different causation requirements. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 162, 168-69, 173, 196, 197 &
n.200. Professor Goldberg's Reply is thus a bit misleading in stating that "Professor Robertson quietly
concedes that the interpreter is required to give some meaning to both requirements" (emphasis ad-
ded), citing only my footnote 198. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 208.
11. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 169-73.
12. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 209.
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(2) Claimant would then invoke the but-for test to address
Section 2702( b)(2)(E)'s "due to" requirement. The ques-
tion would be whether the boycott would have occurred but
for (without, regardless of) injury, destruction, or loss of
property or natural resources.
(3) The but-for test "instructs us to imagine, counterfactu-
ally, a spill causing no damage to, or loss of, property or
natural resources. What manner of spill is this? The an-
swer, of course, is a spill with a very modest impact, for only
a very modest spill is one that will result in no loss of, and
no damage to, natural resources including clean water, land,
and animal and plant life both off and onshore. And yet a
profoundly uneventful spill of this sort is just the sort of spill
that is highly unlikely to cause the sort of freestanding
"reputational loss" that would induce a boycott of a local
gas station far removed from the scene of the spill." 13
I agree with Professor Goldberg's first two steps. His third step seems
wrong. In Goldberg's counterfactual world, the huge and destructive
Macondo spill has been heroically converted into "a spill with a very mod-
est impact," "a very modest spill." Turning a historically enormous oil spill
into a tiny one seems an unduly ambitious imagined alteration of the real
world. As my original article indicates, the proper counterfactual hypothe-
sis in the Boise gas station case is not a tiny, insignificant spill; instead it is a
situation in which "somehow the massive ugly [Macondo] spill had not yet
been shown to have caused the 'injury, destruction, or loss' of anything
physical" at the time the boycott was instituted. 14
Professor Goldberg's way of constructing the counterfactual hypothe-
sis leaves him believing it obvious (or at least enables him to maintain) that
"the occurrence of property or resource damage or loss [was] necessary to
bring about the reputational harm that ... induce[d] the [Boise] boycott."' 5
But he is mistaken, I think, to use the word "occurrence" in this context.
The more probable scenario is that the Boise boycotters did not care
whether or to what extent the Macondo spill had actually damaged any-
thing; they were more likely reacting to the singular enormity of the spill
without any concern for whether the havoc it could be counted on to wreak
had yet begun occurring or become manifest.
13. Id. (emphasis in original).
14. Robertson, supra note 2, at 173.
15. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 210 n.33.
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II. THE FACTUAL CAUSATION REQUIREMENT OF SECTION
2702(B)(2)(E) AND THE GOLDBERG REPORT'S PROXIMATE CAUSE
REQUIREMENT ARE TOOLS OF LEGAL
ANALYSIS, NOT SELF-EXECUTING FORMULAS.
The Goldberg Reply moves from attacking the factual causation inter-
pretation of Section 2702(b)(2)(E) on (I believe mistaken) grounds of
open-endedness to a (somewhat inconsistent?) attack on labor-intensive-
ness grounds. Professor Goldberg deplores the "endless case-by-case spec-
ulations" and the "highly speculative counterfactual inquiries" that he
attributes to the factual causation reading of Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s "due
to" clause, and he says that these issues "would generate a vast amount of
litigation."16 The subsections below argue that Goldberg exaggerates the
difficulties of the 2702(b)(2)(E) factual causation inquiry; that in any event
a 2702(b)(2)(E) proximate cause (or in Professor Goldberg's terms, a
"proximate-cause-like"' 7 ) inquiry would entail far greater difficulties; and
that, comparative difficulties aside, Congress has issued a factual causa-
tion-not a proximate cause or proximate-cause-like-directive that
should be followed.
A. How to Frame the Section 2702(b) (2) (E) Factual Causation Question:
The Disney Case
There has long been "a quite lively debate among scholars about
whether factual cause is an empirical and, therefore, objective inquiry, or
whether it is at least partially normative."'" In a highly influential law re-
view article, Professor Wex Malone argued that policy plays an important
role. 19 "A number of commentators have registered their disagreement."
20
However this may be, "it is hard to escape the feeling that the but-for rule
with its hypothetical alternative [i.e., counterfactual] case can be applied
rigorously in some cases and quite lightly in others."
21
Part I above presents illustrations of the potential flexibility that in-
heres in the but-for analyst's choice of a counterfactual hypothesis. Some
of these choices can be deemed wrong or at least poor ones, on the view
that an ambitious and overly imaginative counterfactual hypothesis can
lead to confusion or serve as a way of avoiding explicit attention to policy
choices entailed in the case.22 But at times the modesty maxim will not be
of much help. In such a case-as is frequently true with legal problems of
16. Id. at 210 n.34.
17. Id. at 211 & n.35, 214 (at footnote signal 51), 215 (at footnote signal 57); cf. id. at 214 ("some-
thing akin to proximate cause").
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26,
cmt. f, Reporters' Notes, p. 365 (2010).
19. Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956).
20. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, at p. 365.
21. DAN B. DoBBs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 173, p. 422 (west 2000).
22. See supra note 7.
2212011]1
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 30:217
all kinds-there seems no substitute for human wisdom or human purpos-
iveness: "Rules will carry those who must pass judgment only so far, figura-
tively speaking, into the neighborhood of the problem to be passed upon,
and then the judges must get off and walk." 23
An example of a counterfactual-hypothesis choice that seems unfet-
tered by the modesty maxim's constraints may serve to pinpoint Professor
Goldberg's and my disagreement over how the but-for test can and should
work in Section 2702(b)(2)(E) cases. "Universe" claimant # 12 is a thinly-
imagined Disney World, which loses money when the flow of visitors to
Florida's unbesmirched Atlantic beaches (and thence to Disney) dwindles
because of Macondo-induced "unease about traveling to Florida." 24 Pre-
sumably Professor Goldberg's version of the Section 2702(b)(2)(E) "but
for" question would be whether the missing tourists would have stayed
away in the face of a tiny, trivial spill in the Gulf of Mexico. (His presump-
tive answer, probably not, means for him that Disney's loss was "due to"
the physical destruction wrought by Macondo.) A more appropriate "but
for" question, I maintain, is to ask whether the missing tourists would have
stayed away with Macondo itself having occurred in a Gulf of Mexico long
since so befouled by frequent oil and chemical spills as to have become
essentially a dead zone for all purposes save mineral exploration. In this
counterfactual hypothesis, Macondo has itself brought about no "injury,
destruction, or loss" of property or resources, because all of the damage
was done long before. In this scenario, would the Atlantic coast beach- and
Disney-goers have stayed away, just as they did? I'd say they probably
would have; seemingly they were worried about what Macondo might do to
Florida's Atlantic beaches and waters and not motivated by concerns about
the Gulf of Mexico. On that view, Disney's losses "result[ed] from"
Macondo (Section 2702(a)), but they were not "due to [any] injury, de-
struction, or loss" of property or resources, so Disney's case would fail on
the basis of the Section 2702(b)(2)(E) factual causation requirement.
Professor Goldberg will probably react that a proximate-cause-based
inquiry would be a more straightforward way of excluding Disney's claim
than my cause-in-fact methodology. For the reasons suggested in Subparts
B and C below, I cannot agree with that reaction. Moreover, even if it
could be shown that the law of proximate cause provides a simpler explana-
tion for denying the plaintiff's claim in this single and arguably somewhat
peculiar case, this ultimately wouldn't matter, for two crucial reasons.
First, my original article demonstrates-I think quite clearly-that Con-
gress decided against embedding a proximate cause requirement in Section
2702(b)(2)(E). Second, bringing the apparatus of proximate cause into the
Disney case would entail bringing that same apparatus-a notoriously ba-
roque and often mysterious apparatus (see Subpart B just below)-into
every Section 2702(b)(2)(E) case, into every Section 2702(b)(2)(D) case,
23. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 214 (1st ed. 1930).
24. GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 13.
222
RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR GOLDBERG
and arguably into other categories of Section 2702(b) damages cases. This
second point is taken up in Part III below.
B. Resolving the Disney Case on Proximate Cause Grounds
The law of proximate cause is infamous for its uncertainty. 25 In Pal-
sgraf v. Long Island R. Co., Judge Andrews called the proximate cause
limit on liability "an uncertain and wavering line" 2 6 that courts must draw
on the basis of "common sense" 27 and "practical politics"
28 rather than
"logic."29 Dean Prosser once suggested that the heart of the matter has
simply been the need to cut off liability at whatever (ad hoc) point the
relationship between defendant's wrongful conduct and plaintiffs accident
comes to seem "too cockeyed and far-fetched."30 Professor Dobbs, speak-
ing only slightly more hopefully of present-day proximate cause thinking,
says:
Judgments about proximate cause are not precise, but, at
least roughly speaking, they reflect the ideas of justice as
well as practicality. . . . The proximate cause rules give us
the language of argument and direct the thought that is
brought to bear when the connection between the defen-
dant's negligence and the plaintiffs injury seems tenuous.
The rules call for judgments, not juggernauts of logic. In
consequence, no version of the rules can be expected to as-
31sure any given answer ina particular case . . .
Concern about the frequent mysteriousness of traditional proximate
cause thinking has led many analysts to seek comfort in differing terminol-
ogy. Decades ago-complaining that "[t]he concept of proximate cause
often obscures the true analysis of a tort"3 2-the Fifth Circuit in a mari-
time-law case shifted to "the modern concept of legal cause" as set forth in
the Second Torts Restatement. 3 3 The court sought to summarize the Sec-
ond Restatement's version of legal cause as follows:
The elements of legal cause are negligence, a causal connec-
tion between the negligence and the injury, the invasion of a
25. See, e.g., DAVID W. ROBERTSON, WILLIAM POWERS, JR., DAVID A. ANDERSON & OLIN Guy
WELLBORN, III, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 158 (4th ed. 2011) ("The proximate cause area of
the law is famously rococo.").
26. 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 103.
29. Id.
30. William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19 (1953).
31. DAN B. DoBSs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 181, pp. 446-47 (West 2000).
32. Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 222 (5th Cir. 1975).
33. Id. at 222-23.
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legally protected interest, and lack of a countervailing le-
gally protected interest as a defense to liability. The defen-
dant's negligence must be a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm, with no rule of law relieving the actor of
fault. "Substantial" means more than "but for" the negli-
gence, the harm would not have resulted, and more than
merely negligible negligence. The gist of it is that some re-
sponsibility for the effect must accompany the cause.34
On its face this summary of the Second Restatement's approach to "legal
cause" looks remarkably question-begging. The Second Restatement itself
seems no better, stating that in the legal cause context, "[t]he word 'sub-
stantial' is used to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an
effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a
cause, using that word in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the
idea of responsibility."3 5
What we have seen so far is that the discourse of traditional proximate
cause provides no solution at all to the Disney case; all it provides is a way
of asking the question whether Disney's claim should be excluded. To es-
cape question begging, we need to turn to the Third Restatement, which
has considerably improved upon the earlier Restatements' treatment of
both factual and proximate causation. Professor Goldberg's original Re-
port admirably summarizes the core of the inquiry the Third Restatement
would aim at the Disney case: Was the harm to Disney a "realization of the
risks of the [defendant's] activity that [has led] the law to regard the activ-
ity as appropriately subject to a rule of strict liability"?3 6 Translating that
question more specifically into the Macondo-spill context, the Third Re-
statement would have the analyst asking something like this: When the
OPA Congress said to BP, "do not let this Macondo monster loose upon
the Gulf of Mexico," did it have in mind the need to avoid harms of the
sort claimed by Disney? Unlike the inquiries that seem to come out of the
Second Restatement version of proximate cause, the Third Restatement's
inquiry is not purely question-begging. But it does circle back on the legis-
lative history of OPA in a somewhat daunting way, and it ultimately pro-
vides no clear answer to the Disney case, but rather just a helpful way of
framing the question.3 7
34. Id. at 223 (citations omitted).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a, p. 429 (1965).
36. GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 22 n.49 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. 1 (2010)).
37. The same can be said of Professor Goldberg's example positing economic-loss claims stem-
ming from "onerous new regulations on drilling" that resulted from the spill and the property damages
it caused. See Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 210. Goldberg stipulates that these claims satisfy both
the Section 2702(a) and Section 2702(b)(2)(E) factual causation requirements. He suggests that he
would use the law of proximate cause to deny the claims on superseding cause grounds on the view that
the Government's "decision to regulate . . . 'breaks' the causal chain." Id. at 211. Arguably the ap-
proach to proximate cause set out in the Third Restatement points to a different result. See supra note
36.
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C. The Law of Proximate Cause is Much Murkier Than the
Law of Cause-in-Fact
Subparts A and B above demonstrate that the factual causation in-
quiry required by Section 2702(b)(2)(E) provides an analytical tool that
takes the analyst some distance toward answering the difficult question
posed by the Disney case, whereas even the best available version of a
proximate cause approach (the Third Restatement version) leaves the ana-
lyst with only a decent starting point. As one of the Reporters of the Third
Restatement has usefully put it:
I fail to see the attraction of employing a normative-judg-
mental standard for a proposition that falls well within the
definition of [factual] causation. . . . [T]here is no reason to
move to the murky world of proximate cause and interven-
ing acts to resolve this matter.38
III. PROFESSOR GOLDBERG'S "PROXIMATE-CAUSE-LIKE"
USE-RIGHT LIMIT
We have just seen that any "vast amount of litigation"
39 stemming
from Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s factual causation requirement would almost
surely be greatly multiplied by interpreting the statute to require a proxi-
mate cause (or "proximate-cause-like" 0) connection between spill-caused
damage to resources or property and claimed-for economic losses. Profes-
sor Goldberg might counter that his particular version of a proximate-
cause-like limit-the use-right limit-is nowhere near as murky as normal
proximate cause law. Were it not for one crucial caveat, he would probably
be right about that.4 1 But the caveat is large: In both his original Report
and in his Reply, Professor Goldberg repeatedly indicates that courts
should feel fairly free (and thus presumably should often be urged by liti-
gants to) waver away from the use-right line.
4 2
38. Michael D. Green, The Intersection of Factual Causation and Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV.
671, 680 n.31 (2006).
39. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 210 n.34.
40. See supra note 17.
41. But see David W. Robertson, An American Perspective on Negligence Law: Bright-Line Rules
Seldom Stay Bright for Long, in MARKESINIS AND DEAKIN's TORT LAw 283, 300-02 (6th ed. 2008).
42. See GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 30, 40 (attributing use-rights to owner and employee of
beachfront hotel, without explaining how such rights could be established or derived); id. at 33 (sug-
gesting that liability might properly "extend[ ] to certain additional claimants" despite their lack of use-
rights); id. at 39 (contemplating occasional "particular[ly] generous reading[s] of OPA"); id. at 40 &
n.92 (indicating that a barge owner/operator should probably be compensated although he might not be
able to meet the use-right requirement); id. at 41-42 (calling for similar leniency for a restaurant, a real
estate agent, and a furniture store). See also Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 212 n.40 (putting ships'
chandlers in "the gray area" where the use-right requirement might properly be relaxed or dispensed
with).
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In any event-however clear-edged the use-right restriction might or
might not turn out to be-the restriction is unacceptable,43 for all of the
reasons set forth in my original article as well as those sketched in the sub-
sections below.
A. A Preliminary Inquiry: What is the Purported
Statutory Source of the Use-Right Limit?
In his original Report, Professor Goldberg clearly and repeatedly indi-
cated that the use-right limit is to be found in "Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s 'due
to' clause."" Here, for example, is a key passage from the Report:
[I]t is entirely natural to read Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s "due
to" clause as requiring as a condition of recovery for lost
profits or impaired earning capacity a nexus beyond bare
causation between the lost profits or impaired earning ca-
pacity (on the one hand) and the damage to, or loss of,
property or natural resources (on the other). No interpre-
tive gymnastics are required. Rather, one need only treat
the phrase "due to" as refining the actual causation require-
ment already specified by the "result from" language of Sec-
tion 2702(a).4 5
The Report goes on to argue that the required "nexus beyond bare causa-
tion" is the use-right limit:
[Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s] "due to" clause . . . clearly indi-
cates that not all . . . claimants are permitted to recover. A
reading of the section in light of the presumption favoring
narrow derogation is thus appropriate. It suggests that Con-
gress's aim in enacting Section 2702(b)(2)(E) was to extend
liability along lines tentatively identified by judicial deci-
sions that have pushed the boundaries of the economic loss
rule. To say the same thing: OPA's economic loss provisions
are best understood as expanding liability for economic loss
beyond owners and lessees of property that has been dam-
aged to any person whose business's profitability depends
on his or her ability to exercise a right physically to obtain
or use property or resources that are damaged or lost be-
cause of an oil spill. . . . Reading OPA in this manner
makes sense of the "due to" clause's linkage of recovery for
43. 1 am by no means alone in finding it unacceptable. See Robert Force, Martin Davies &
Joshua S. Force, Deep water Horizon: Removal Costs, Civil Damages, Crimes, Civil Penalties, and State
Remedies in Oil Spill Cases, 85 TUL. L. REV. 889, 938--41 (2011) [hereinafter "Force"] (criticizing the
Goldberg Report for proposing an unduly narrow interpretation of Section 2702(b)(2)(E), for internal
inconsistencies, and for seeming "to punt on the really hard cases").
44. GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 20.
45. Id. (emphasis supplied).
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economic loss to property or resources being damaged or
made physically unavailable. Economic loss is "due to"
property or resource damage, or loss, when profits or earn-
ings suffer because the damage, or loss, prevents or hinders
the claimant from putting that property or those resources
to commercial use, as is her right. Any claimant who has
such a use-right . . . stands to recover. 4 6
The Report includes numerous other statements and indications that the
use-right requirement emanates from Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s "due to"
clause. 47
Now, in his Reply, Professor Goldberg shifts ground and insists that
his proposed proximate-cause-like use-right limit does not depend on "the
meaning of the phrase 'due to"' but instead emanates from "the meaning
of OPA's two-layer causation requirement" or of "OPA's test for economic
loss liability, taken as a whole."4 8 The apparent motive for this shift is to
assuage or diminish the importance of doubt whether the phrase "due to"
can as a matter of "ordinary usage" 49 bear the weight that Goldberg's origi-
nal Report seemed to place on it.5o But-as subsection B just below makes
clear-the consequences of the shift go far beyond that debate.
46. Id. at 31-32.
47. See id. at 7, 11 (putting Section 2702(a) under subheading "liability trigger" and Section
2702(b)(2)(E) under heading "the 'due to' requirement"); id. at 15-16 (putting Section 2702(a) under
subheading "actual causation" and using "Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s 'due to' clause" as a separate sub-
heading); id. at 17 (emphasizing that "Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s 'due to' clause imposes a second-layer
causation requirement on top of the initial 'result from' requirement set by Section 2702(a)"); id. at 17
n.36 (stating "that Congress intended . .. limits on liability for economic loss beyond proof of actual loss
and actual causation" and that this is clear "because the 'due to' clause of Section 2702(b)(2)(E) stands
separate and apart from 2702(a)'s 'result from' clause and, as such, explicitly states an independent
limitation on such liability") (emphasis supplied); id. at 18 n.38 (emphasizing that "the 'due to" clause
[is] an expressly stated limitation on . . . liability") (emphasis in original); id. at 41 (identifying "OPA's
'due to' requirement" as the source of the use-right impediment to recovery for "claimants R, A, W").
48. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 208 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 206 n.17 (stating
that "the Report's analysis does not hinge on a claim that the proper way to read OPA is to substitute
the phrase 'proximately caused by' for the phrase 'due to' in Section 2702(b)(2)(E)"); id. at 213 (em-
phasizing that "the Report's analysis does not rest on a claim about the meaning of the words 'due to,'
taken in isolation. It instead rests on the double-layered causation requirement established by the
interaction of Sections 2702(a) and 2702(b)(2)(E).").
49. Id. at 207.
50. Professor Goldberg ultimately dismisses the question whether "due to" can sensibly be read
to mean "proximately caused by" as a "red herring." Id. But before doing so, he presents a brief
argument that in ordinary usage, "due to" can carry more proximate-cause freight than "result from."
He uses this example: "Imagine a newscast reporting that a plane crash was 'due to' pilot error." Id.
Professor Goldberg rightly maintains that in this example, "due to" means something like "proximately
caused by." But the meaning of the sentence in no way changes when "resulted from" is substituted for
"was due to." It is the context, not the particular causal phrase, that tells the hearer whether the
speaker means cause-in-fact, proximate cause, or both. The Hart and Honore treatise Professor
Goldberg invokes actually makes this very point, noting that a statement that an explosion on earth
caused a flash of light in the unimaginably far distant outer nebulae is perfectly intelligible as a claim of
but-for causation whereas a statement that the manufacture of a bullet caused a murder victim's death
would seem confused because the context carries a proximate-cause attribution. See H.L.A. HART &
ToNY HONORE, Causation in the Law 68 (2d ed. 1985). Subsequently in the Reply, Professor Goldberg
concedes that in their usages in Section 2702, the OPA "phrases 'resulting from' and 'due to' do not
carry dramatically different meanings." Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 213.
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B. The Consequences of Tying Professor Goldberg's Proximate-Cause-
Like Use-Right Limit to the "Interaction of
Sections 2702 (a) and 2702(b) (2) (E) ""
My original article points out that reading Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s
"due to" clause to establish a use-right limit seems to require reading the
identically-worded clause of Section 2702(b)(2)(D) to do so as well.5 2 Sec-
tion 2702(b)(2)(D) enables "the United States, a State, or a political subdi-
vision" to recover "[d]amages equal to the net loss of taxes [and similar
revenues] due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal
property, or natural resources."" How would any of these governmental
entities go about establishing that it had a use-right in spill-damaged prop-
erty or resources? I do not see how this would be possible. It seems to me
that reading a use-right limit into Section 2702(b)(2)(D)'s "due to" clause
would make no sense at all.
When the Goldberg Reply moves the source of the use-right limit
from Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s "due to" clause to "the double-layered causa-
tion requirement established by the interaction of Sections 2702(a) and
2702(b)(2)(E)," 5 4 the problem of making sense of a use-right (or some
broadly similar "proximate-cause-like" 5 ) limit may have spread beyond
subsections (D) and (E) to other Section 2702(b)(2) subsections. For ex-
ample, consider Section 2702(b)(2)(B), which enables owners and lessees
of spill-affected property to recover "[d]amages for injury to, or economic
losses resulting from destruction of, real or personal property." 6 Reading
Section 2702(b)(2)(B) in combination with Section 2702(a)-which Profes-
sor Goldberg seems to agree is required 57-evidently yields a "double-
layered causation requirement" of the same "generic" 8 sort presented by
the combination of Sections 2702(a) and 2702(b)(2)(E). 5 9 So it seems
probable that Goldberg's proposed interpretation of OPA invites defend-
ants in Section 2702(b)(2)(B) cases to make "proximate-cause-like" 0
arguments.
51. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 213.
52. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 201-02.
53. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(D).
54. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 213.
55. See supra note 17.
56. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(B) (emphasis supplied).
57. See GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 19 (stating that "each of [Section 2702(b)'s] six separate
damages provisions purport to apply to any type of discharge that violates Section 2702(a)"); id. at
19-20 n.40 (reiterating that "the various damages provisions of Section 2702(b) are written generically
to cover all violations of Section 2702(a)").
58. Id. at 19-20 n.40.
59. At one point, the Goldberg Report asserts that Section 2702(b)(2)(B) "authorize[s] claims
that are defined without reference to a second layer of causation analysis." Id at 18 n.37. On the face
of the statute, the assertion seems wrong; Section 2702(a) requires all classes of claimants to show that
their damages "result/ed] from" the spill, and Section 2702(b)(2)(B) requires owners and lessors to
make an additional showing that they sustained "[djamages for injury to, or economic losses resulting
from destruction of, real or personal property" (emphasis supplied).
60. See supra note 17.
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I do not know whether Professor Goldberg thinks it would be a good
idea for Section 2702(b)(2)(B) defendants to be armored with proximate
cause arguments. I do not. Suppose, for example, that the Coast Guard
decides to divert fresh or brackish water outward from Louisiana coastal
areas in an effort to thwart the impending inflow of oil from a spill like
Macondo. The result is a massive oyster kill. Should the damaged oys-
termen's Section 2702(b)(2)(B) claims6 1 be impeded by intervening/super-
seding cause arguments of the sort that Professor Goldberg has (in a
related context) approved?6 2 If you think not, then opening the door to
such arguments "counts against [Goldberg's] reading of OPA." 6 3
Section 2702(b)(2)(A) is another OPA provision that conceivably has
its meaning clouded by the Goldberg Reply's attribution of proximate-
cause-like restraints to a "double-layered causation requirement estab-
lished by the interaction of Sections 2702(a)" 64 and Section 2702(b) subsec-
tions. Section 2702(b)(2)(A) enables governmental and tribal trustees to
recover "[d]amages for injury to, destruction or, loss of, or loss of use of,
natural resources."6 5 The Goldberg Report correctly observes that this
provision lacks explicit "reference to a second layer of causation analy-
sis,"66 but it is not difficult to imagine an oil-spill defendant's argument that
some kind of "proximate-cause-like" 67 limit is implicit in the statutory term
"for." Any such argument would likely be impossible to reconcile with the
spirit of the NOAA "passive use" regulations that are sketched in my origi-
nal article. 6 8 But it may be that the Goldberg Reply's broadening of the
statutory basis for the proximate-cause-like/use-right proposition will en-
courage defendants to give it a try.
IV. OTHER POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT
A. How Much Does Professor Goldberg's Proposed OPA Regime
Differ from Pre-OPA Law?
The Goldberg Report anticipated and offered a response to the argu-
ment that on Professor Goldberg's proposed reading, OPA's economic-loss
regime "accomplishes very little because it merely replicates schemes of
liability already in place under admiralty law and state tort law." 6 9 Indeed,
my original article was broadly critical of the narrowness of Professor
61. Under Louisiana law, oyster lessees have a proprietary right in the oyster beds. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 56:423 (2011); Inabnett v. Exxon Corp., 642 So. 2d 1243 (La. 1994).
62. See supra note 37.
63. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 210 n.34.
64. Id. at 213.
65. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A).
66. GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 18 n.37.
67. See supra note 17.
68. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 178 & n.79.
69. GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 32. The Report made three points in response, arguing that its
reading of OPA (a) would provide a firm footing for maritime law's commercial fishermen's rule, (b)
would expand scattered state use-rights jurisprudence into a national rule, and (c) could appropriately
be relaxed in favor of "certain additional [non-use-right] claimants" should the courts so choose. Id. at
31-32.
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Goldberg's use-right restriction,70 arguing that the "use-right requirement
would be nothing more (or less) than a slightly flabby, slightly blurry ver-
sion of Robins/Testbank.""
On one reading of Professor Goldberg's Reply, he may now be charac-
terizing the distance between the use-right proposal and pre-OPA law a bit
more broadly than in the Report. The Report indicated throughout that an
economic-loss claimant should have to show that the spill deprived him of a
right to put damaged property or resources "to commercial use," 7 2 whereas
the Reply suggests that the loss of "a particular right to use" spill-damaged
property or resources may suffice?3 The noted difference in the descrip-
tion of the use-right proposal-"commercial" versus "particular"-is ad-
mittedly minor and may not be meaningful.
It is more clearly meaningful that the Report and Reply evidently dif-
fer in their characterizations of the pre-OPA maritime law regime. The
Report is perhaps slightly ambiguous on the point, but it should probably
be read to describe the Robins/Testbank rule not to require an economic-
loss claimant to show a causal connection between physical damage to his
person or property and the claimed-for economic damages, but only that
the claimant sustained physical personal or property damage in the acci-
dent giving rise to the economic loss. 7 4 As my original article asserts, this
seems to be the accepted reading of Testbank.7 ' But the Reply puts for-
ward a more restrictive reading of Testbank, indicating that Testbank re-
quired "proof that the [economic] loss was parasitic on [i.e., caused by]
damage to the claimant's property." 76 The Reply proclaims that OPA has
made a pronounced change to that version of Testbank; its first sentence
70. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 165 n.41, 177 n.92, 179-80 & nn.107-08.
71. Id. at 177.
72. GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 3, 32, 36. See also id. at 31 (stating that even liberal state courts
require economic-loss plaintiffs to show "a right and a commercial need" to use property made unavail-
able by defendants' negligence); id. at 32 (suggesting that an OPA economic-loss claimant will need to
show that his "business's profitability" suffered because of the loss of "a right physically to obtain or
use" spill-damaged property or resources); id. at 34 (characterizing Section 2702(b)(2)(E) as "the com-
mercial use counterpart" to Section 2702(b)(2)(C)) (italics in original); id. at 38 n.87 (stating that Sec-
tion 2702(b)(2)(E) plaintiffs are required to show physical harm "to property or resources they are
entitled to use for commercial purposes").
73. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 203; see also id. at 208 (speaking of "economic loss predi-
cated on a loss of, or injury to, property or resources that the claimant had a right to use, but neither
owned nor leased").
74. See GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 26 (stating that under the Testbank rule liability for eco-
nomic loss "extended only to those who owned property physically damaged by the accident" without
any indication that the physical property damage must have caused the economic loss); id. at 27 n.60
(3d paragraph) (citing three treatises, two of which express the economic loss rule without implying any
required causal nexus between physical property damage and the claimed-for economic loss).
75. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 166 n.37; see also Force, supra note 43, at 929 (stating that the
Robins/Testbank rule precluded "recovery of purely economic losses in the absence of physical damage
to property in which the plaintiff had a proprietary interest") (emphasis supplied); id. at 931 (quoting
from OPA's legislative history a passage indicating that under OPA "the absence of any physical dam-
age to the proprietary interest of the claimant" will no longer be a barrier to recovery in oil spill cases)
(emphasis supplied).
76. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 215 (emphasis supplied).
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describes OPA's economic-loss provisions as authorizing recovery of eco-
nomic losses "that do not result from personal injury to the claimant or
damage to property owned by the claimant." I do not want to make too
much of this, but it does seem worth mentioning that the Goldberg Reply
expresses a minority view of Robins/Testbank, perhaps as a way of opening
up a little more distance between the pre-OPA economic loss regime and
the OPA regime that Professor Goldberg proposes.
B. Converting a Liability-Enhancing Statute Into an Affirmative
Defense is More than a "Molehill.""
OPA's strict liability provision-Section 2702-enables economic-loss
plaintiffs to recover monetarily capped damages and does not expressly in-
clude proximate cause among the required elements of proof.79 OPA's
provision allowing plaintiffs to go beyond strict liability and make a show-
ing of fault in order to recover damages above the monetary caps-Section
2704(c)(1)-does expressly include proximate cause among the required el-
ements of proof.so The presence of the proximate cause requirement in the
liability-enhancing provision together with its conspicuous absence in the
strict-liability capped-damages provision seems a quite strong indication
that Congress did not want to require proximate causation for strict liabil-
ity purposes.8 1
In the course of an effort to refute the strength of that indication, the
Goldberg Report inadvertently mischaracterized Section 2704(c)(1) (the
provision including the express proximate cause requirement) as an affirm-
ative defense to liability.82 The mischaracterization enabled Professor
Goldberg to argue with some conviction that the omission of proximate
cause language in Section 2702 was not particularly meaningful.
Goldberg's argument might have had some plausibility if Section
2704(c)(1) had actually been an affirmative defense; it is not outlandish to
suppose that Congress might have phrased causation requirements for lia-
bility-imposing purposes and liability-avoiding purposes in different terms
without intending different substantive meanings. (For example, OPA's ac-
tual affirmative defense provision, 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a), includes a "prepon-
derance of the evidence" requirement that does not appear but may be
implicit in Section 2702.)
77. Id. at 203 (emphasis supplied).
78. Id. at 206.
79. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (requiring OPA plaintiffs to show that their damages "result[ed]
from" a spill or threatened spill); 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (requiring economic loss plaintiffs to show
that their "[d]amages [were] due to . . . injury, destruction, or loss of . . . natural resources" or of
property).
80. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (allowing plaintiffs to recover damages above the monetary caps
by showing that the spill or threatened spill "was proximately caused by" certain types of misconduct
on defendants' part).
81. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 185.
82. See GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 20 n.42. For discussion of the mischaracterization, see Rob-
ertson, supra note 2, at 186-87.
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But when Section 2704(c)(1) is correctly identified as a liability-en-
hancing provision, its expression of a proximate cause requirement lends
grave and imposing significance to Section 2702's silence on the proximate
cause front. The probable message is that Congress wanted to require
plaintiffs who seek uncapped damages to meet a more demanding causa-
tion requirement than those who are content with capped damages. Thus,
Professor Goldberg's transmogrification of Section 2704(c)(1) into an af-
firmative defense seems to be much bigger than a "molehill.""
C. Legislative History
The Goldberg Reply takes the same generally minimalist approach to
OPA's comprehensive legislative history as the Report,8 4 and the Reply's
three main legislative history points8 5 seem easily refutable. First, the Re-
ply suggests that legislative history supporting ships' chandlers' rights to
recover economic-loss damages may have been merely "a stray bit of legis-
lative history," 86 one of those "stray statements"" legislators sometimes
make that "possibly point[ ] in a different direction than an interpretation
that is overwhelmingly supported by a statute's text."88 But no one-not
even Professor Goldberg himself 9-thinks that OPA's text "overwhelm-
ingly" (or even at all) indicates that chandlers should not recover. 90 And
Representative Schneider's "bait and tackle store owners" statement was
fully consistent not only with the text of OPA but with the entire thrust and
direction of all of OPA's legislative history. 9' The two cases Professor
Goldberg cites in connection with his "stray" legislator suggestion 92 in fact
weigh rather strongly against Goldberg's disparagement of the "bait and
tackle store" statement.9 3
83. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 206.
84. See GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 33-34; Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 213. Cf Robertson,
supra note 2, at 175 n.59, 184-88.
85. In a fourth point, the Goldberg Reply concedes that "the House Conference Report on OPA
... suggests that the phrases 'resulting from' [reflecting 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)] and 'due to" [33 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b)(2)(E)] do not carry dramatically different meanings." Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 213.
86. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 212.
87. Id. at 211 n.37.
88. Id. at 212.
89. See id. at 212 n.40 (suggesting that chandlers should probably be authorized to recover eco-
nomic-loss damages regardless of their inability to establish a use-right).
90. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 175 (arguing that it is almost unthinkable that OPA would
exclude chandlers); Force, supra note 43, at 939 (criticizing the Goldberg Report for excluding
chandlers).
91. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. H7954-02, H7962 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep.
Hughes) (discussing the need for protecting "those who rely on the oceans for their livelihoods"); Rob-
ertson, supra note 2, at 19-20 n.58 (quoting numerous other statements to the same effect).
92. See Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 212 n.42 (citing the two cases treated infra note 93).
93. In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, the Court relied heavily on the statement of Rep. Moss (the bill's
sponsor), noting that while Moss's statement was not "controlling," it was 'clear" and "instructive."
441 U.S. 281, 311 12 & n.42 (1979). In In re Kelly, the enacted legislation explicitly stated that "con-
sumer debt" includes "secured" debt, so the court characterized Sen. DeConcini's and Rep. Edwards's
flatly contrary statements as not just "[s]tray" but as "likely" inspired by the two legislators' disagree-
ment with the congressional majority. 841 F.2d 908, 912 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Second, the Goldberg Reply tries to brush aside the potent fact that
Section 2702(b)(2)(E) does not express a use-right requirement while a
nearby and closely related provision, Section 2702(b)(2)(C), does.9 4 Pro-
fessor Goldberg deems this a "little" matter because the 1990 Senate Re-
port on OPA presents the two provisions as "parallel ... by virtue of [their
both] responding to interferences with use-rights." 95 Professor Goldberg's
reasoning here is hard to decipher. Here is the relevant passage of the
Senate Report:
[The damages provisions of Section 2702(b)] are intended to
provide compensation for a wide range of injuries and are
not so narrowly focused as to prevent victims of an oil spill
from receiving reasonable compensation. For example, eco-
nomic damages include both loss of use [Section
2702(b)(2)(E)] and loss of subsistence use [Section
2702(b)(2)(C)] of natural resources.96
The "parallel" drawn by the Senate Report is simply that both provisions
"include" loss-of-use damages. The quoted passage of the Senate Report
does not purport to address either provision's requirements and restric-
tions, much less the significantly nonparallel feature emphasized in my
original article 9 7-that the omission of a use-right requirement in subsec-
tion (E), when contrasted with the explicit use-right requirement in subsec-
tion (C), has powerful implications for the meaning of (E). In his Reply,
Professor Goldberg seems simply to be proclaiming that (C) and (E) are
"parallel" when they plainly are not.
Third, Professor Goldberg's Reply addresses the fact that use-right re-
quirements-provisions that would have required Section 2702(b)(2)(E)
claimants to show that they derived at least 25 percent of their earnings
from using property or resources that were damaged by a spill-were de-
leted from three of the bills that eventually coalesced to form OPA.98 The
Supreme Court has stated that when Congress deletes a requirement from
proposed legislation before enacting it, a presumption arises that the re-
quirement was not intended to be part of the statute.9 9 Professor Goldberg
affects to shrug off the presumption by saying this: "[T]he deletion as read-
ily or more readily supports the Report's interpretation, for it suggests that
94. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 184.
95. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 206-07 n.17.
96. S. REP. No. 101-94, at 12 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 734.
97. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 184-86.
98. See id. at 185.
99. See id. n.118 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983), for the proposi-
tion that "[w]here Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior
to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended") (emphasis supplied).
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legislators all along had use-rights in mind, but simply decided against set-
ting a threshold damage requirement for claims of interference with such
rights."100
This seems to be a good place for Ockham's Razor.101 Here are two
possible explanations for Congress's deletion of the 25-percent-use-right
requirements. The first is Professor Goldberg's; the second is mine:
(1) Congress deleted the 25-percent-use-right requirements
because it wanted to keep the use-right requirements but to
get rid of the 25 percent measure.
(2) Congress deleted the 25-percent-use-right requirements
because it wanted to get rid of the use-right requirements.
Ockham's Razor validates the second explanation.
D. Evaluating Relevant Case Law
In my original article I argued that decisions of the supreme courts of
Alaska, California, and New Jersey repudiated the economic loss rule, and
that the Goldberg Report distorted these decisions by converting them into
narrow situation-specific relaxations of the rule.102 The Goldberg Reply's
only answer is to quote Professor Rabin's characterization of the New
Jersey case as a "lonely outpost." 03 The existence of the seminal Califor-
nia and Alaska decisions goes some way toward refuting the literal mean-
ing that Professor Goldberg seems to be ascribing to "lonely outpost," and
the other New Jersey, California, and Alaska decisions treated in my article
go quite a way further. 04
The Goldberg Reply allocates a considerable discussiono' to the deci-
sions in Benefiel v. Exxon Corp.10 6 and In re Glacier Bay.' 0 7 As is noted in
my original article, the district court in Glacier Bay adopted a "plain lan-
guage" reading of TAPAA under which "all provable damages sustained
by any person as a result of [an oil spill covered by the statute] are compen-
sable."'s Subsequently-without mentioning Glacier Bay-the Ninth Cir-
cuit said in Benefiel that "TAPAA did not intend to abrogate all principles
100. Goldberg Reply, supra note 1, at 213 (italics in original); see also id. at 206-07 n.17 (sug-
gesting that Congress deleted "a threshold level of interference with use-rights" rather than the use-
rights requirement itself).
101. For an explanation and demonstration of the use of Ockham's Razor, see Goldberg Reply,
supra note 1, at 205.
102. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 181-84 (discussing Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743
P.2d 356 (Alaska 1987), J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979), and People Express Airlines,
Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (1985)).
103. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 214 n.49 (quoting Professor Rabin's characterization of
People Express, supra note 102, in Robert L. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries and the Economic Loss
Rule in Tort, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 857, 858 (2006)).
104. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 182-83 n.108.
105. See Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 214-15 & nn.51-58.
106. 959 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1992).
107. 746 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Alaska 1990).
108. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 178 (quoting Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. at 1386).
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of proximate cause." 109 Professor Goldberg's Reply correctly notes the ob-
vious fact that because of Benefiel, a "lawyer appearing in court within the
Ninth Circuit could not properly cite Glacier Bay for the proposition that
TAPAA contains no proximate cause limitations."" 0 But Professor
Goldberg then goes too far by insisting that Benefiel stands for a robust
"implicit proximate-cause-like limitation"11 -i.e., for something like the
Goldberg Report's use-rights proposal-in TAPAA cases. As is pointed
out in my original article, the TAPAA claimants who were excluded on
proximate cause grounds in Benefiel were extreme outliers.1 12 In light of
the Benefiel court's relatively narrow holding-together with its guarded
language (stating only that not "all" proximate cause principles were "ab-
rogated") and its omission of any mention of the Glacier Bay "plain lan-
guage" proclamation-a Ninth Circuit lawyer could certainly argue that
when the two cases are read together they indicate that the proximate
cause limitation on TAPAA claimants is nothing like the Goldberg use-
right limit but something more akin to Dean Prosser's "too cockeyed and
far-fetched"113 outer boundary.114
The Goldberg Reply allocates no discussion whatever to my original
article's demonstration that the district court in Dunham-Price Group,
L.L.C. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.115
"reject[ed] . . . a version of Professor Goldberg's central [use-right]
argument."' 16 The Reply handles Dunham-Price by ignoring it.
V. CONCLUSION
The "fundamental error""' of the Goldberg Report is not-as Profes-
sor Goldberg supposes is my view-that he has built a large and formidable
proximate-cause-like use-right edifice atop the frail statutory words "due
to;" the truly fundamental error is the nature of the edifice itself. The use-
right restriction is far too narrow for all of the reasons set forth in my origi-
nal article and for the additional broadly similar reasons put forward by
109. 959 F.2d at 807.
110. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 214 n.52.
111. Id. at 213.
112. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 179 (noting that the Benefiel claimants were attempting to tie
increased gasoline prices in California to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska).
113. See supra note 30.
114. The Goldberg Reply's further insistence that the existence of a proximate cause limitation on
TAPAA claims "surely" means that a robust proximate cause limit must be read into OPA cases de-
pends entirely on Professor Goldberg's pervasive assertion that the two-tiered causation structure of
OPA must necessarily require something beyond factual causation connections. Goldberg Reply, supra
note 3, at 214-15 & n.58. But Goldberg has instanced nothing beyond ex cathedra assertions in support
of the view that a two-tiered causation structure inherently or necessarily requires at least one of the
required causation showings to mean proximate cause. For another two-tiered causation structure in
which each tier probably means cause-in-fact, see 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (indicating that an employee in-
jured in an attack by a third person is entitled to Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
benefits provided the injury "[arose] out of and in the course of employment" and the attack was
"directed against [the] employee because of his employment").
115. No. 2:07 CV 1019, 2010 WL 1285446 (W.D. La. Mar. 31, 2010).
116. Robertson, supra note 2, at 190.
117. Goldberg Reply, supra note 3, at 207.
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Tulane Professors Force, Davies, and Force in an article that has come to
light since my original article was completed."' On one point, especially,
the Tulane professors and I see eye to eye: Because it is so clear that the
OPA Congress "enacted remedial legislation that ought to be construed
liberally,"" 9 the Goldberg Report's application of the "statutes-in-deroga-
tion" canon1 20 as the linchpin of the use-right proposal was wholly inappro-
priate. In the words of U.S. Supreme Court justices dissenting from a
creative statutory-construction exercise, "I cannot join in this exercise in
judicial legerdemain. I think the statute still means what it says."121
VI. POSTSCRIPT
As this response was going to press, the U.S. Supreme Court handed
down a 5-4 decision holding that the causation standard in negligence ac-
tions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)122 is factual cau-
sation and not "stock proximate cause. "123 Justice Ginsburg's opinion for
the Court was joined by Justices Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
In a section of Justice Ginsburg's opinion that was not joined by Justice
Thomas, she wrote:
Congress, it is true, has written the words "proximate
cause" into a number of statutes. But when the legislative
text uses less legalistic language, e.g., "caused by," "occa-
sioned by," "in consequence of," or, as in FELA, "resulting
in whole or in part from," and the legislative purpose is to
loosen constraints on recovery, there is little reason for
courts to hark back to stock, judge-made proximate-cause
formulations.124
118. See Force, supra note 43.
119. Id. at 938.
120. Robertson, supra note 2, at 193-94.
121. Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 132 (1962) (Stewart and Harlan, JJ., dissenting
from Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court).
122. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2006).
123. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, No. 10-235, slip op. at 18-19 (U.S. June 23, 2011).
124. Id. at 16 (footnote and citation omitted).
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